Democratic Governance and Economic Performance

How Accountability Can Go Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business de

Éditeur :

Springer


Collection :

Studies in Public Choice

Paru le : 2009-06-02

eBook Téléchargement , DRM LCP 🛈 DRM Adobe 🛈
Lecture en ligne (streaming)
108,89

Téléchargement immédiat
Dès validation de votre commande
Image Louise Reader présentation

Louise Reader

Lisez ce titre sur l'application Louise Reader.

Description
Conventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. But logically extending this wisdom implies that associated principals – voters, consumers, shareholders – will favor themselves over the greater good when ‘rules of the game’ instead create too much accountability. Democratic Governance and Economic Performance rigorously develops this hypothesis, and finds statistical evidence and case study illustrations that democratic institutions at various governance levels (e.g., federal, state, corporation) have facilitated opportunistic gains for electoral, consumer, and shareholder principals. To be sure, this conclusion does not dismiss the potential for democratic governance to productively reduce agency costs. Rather, it suggests that policy makers, lawyers, and managers can improve governance by weighing the agency benefits of increased accountability against the distributional costs of favoring principal stakeholders over more general economic opportunities. Carefully considering the fundamentals that give rise to this tradeoff should interest students and scholars working at the intersection of social science and the law, and can help professionals improve their own performance in policy, legal, and business settings.
Pages
131 pages
Collection
Studies in Public Choice
Parution
2009-06-02
Marque
Springer
EAN papier
9780387787060
EAN EPUB
9780387787077

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
1
Nombre pages imprimables
13
Taille du fichier
379 Ko
Prix
108,89 €