Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

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Éditeur :

Springer


Collection :

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Paru le : 2013-04-03

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Description
?A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
Pages
168 pages
Collection
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Parution
2013-04-03
Marque
Springer
EAN papier
9783642358210
EAN EPUB
9783642358227

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
1
Nombre pages imprimables
16
Taille du fichier
1178 Ko
Prix
52,74 €